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Abstract 
Based on a review of contemporary literature, this paper provides formal definitions of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate sustainability (CS) that are 
theoretically founded within the body of Paretean welfare economics and the economics 
of sustainable development. It shows that CS and CSR are distinct, but interrelated 
concepts that are usefully formalized in terms of capital-theoretic and welfare-economic 
approaches. CSR can particularly constitute a strategy to cope with externalities and serve 
as insurance against reputational risks that harm profit prospects and corporate value. But, 
it is not sufficient for sustainable development. As a consequence, we propagate the use 
of a sustainability-based social value function that integrates different concepts of 
sustainability at the aggregate level, and can be used for the evaluation of a company’s 
CSR performance from a societal perspective. This approach is complementary to the 
capital-based assessment of a company’s CS and internal CSR evaluation. 
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1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate sustainability (CS) 
increasingly gained attention in public debate, entrepreneurial networks and 
academic research. Attempts are frequently made to link CSR and CS with the 
global challenge of sustainable development. The OECD (2001), for instance, 
comprehends CSR as the “business’s contribution to sustainable development”. It 
particularly emphasizes that corporate behavior must not only ensure returns to 
shareholders, wages to employees, and products and services to consumers, but 
also respond to societal and environmental concerns and values. Apparently, this 
implicates a shift from the pure shareholder perspective of maximizing profits and 
corporate value towards a broader concept that encompasses multiple stakeholder 
concerns and values and, thus, involves various conflicting goals and objectives. It 
is therefore no surprise that CSR has different meanings to different groups and 
commentators. 
Contemporary approaches and definitions of CSR are mostly driven by some 
particular view, interest and context. They are not generally consistent with a 
comprehensive approach of sustainable development, which involves a 
continuous evaluation of trade-offs among economic, social and environmental 
system goals, within bounds of criticality (cf. Barbier, 1987; Pearce et al., 1994; 
Hediger, 2000). Moreover, the concept of corporate sustainability (CS) is often 
used as a synonym of CSR (e.g., Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; Marrewijk, 2003; 
Marrewijk and Werre, 2003; Wilson, 2003), without examination of the 
theoretical foundations of the two concepts and their relationship. 
To fill into this gap, the aim of this article is to provide an analytical 
framework for linking the concepts of corporate social responsibility and 
corporate sustainability with each other and with an integrated approach of 
sustainable development that unifies the analytical rigor of neoclassical capital 
theory and welfare economics with the transdisciplinary system view of   2 
ecological economics.
1 In other words, the aim of this article is to further the basic 
understanding of the relationships between CSR, CS and sustainable development 
by elaborating formal conditions that must be satisfied for CSR and CS, 
respectively. This does not imply that a company must behave in accordance with 
these criteria. Rather, this article provides an analytical framework for the internal 
and external evaluation of a company with regard to its CSR performance. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides a review of contemporary definitions of CSR and CS. These definitions 
are reconsidered in section 3 in the light of Paretean welfare economics. On this 
basis, a formal definition is provided which allows us to analyze the issue of CSR 
from both an internal perspective of the firm and an external view of society. 
Moreover, it allows us to provide a theoretically founded distinction between CSR 
and CS. Section 4 brings then a shift from the company level to the aggregate 
level of social welfare and sustainable development. It is devoted to a brief review 
of sustainability concepts and the presentation of an aggregate evaluation concept 
against which corporate contributions to society (sustainable development) can be 
examined. The latter step is formalized in Section 5, where the societal and 
corporate views are integrated. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2  Contemporary definitions of CSR and corporate 
sustainability 
Although the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is prominent in some 
of the current discussions and investigations about the role of business in society, 
the concept as such is not new. Carroll (1999) describes the diverse history behind 
the concept. It is characterized by changing definitions and interpretations over 
time, ranging from early expressions of concern about the social responsibility of 
businessmen in the 1930s to the debates about globalization and the roles of 
business in society since the 1990s (see also CAMAC, 2005, and Vogel, 2005). 
Moreover, following the United Nation’s Earth Summit on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa, the idea 
of CSR has gained a new momentum in the world of business and politics.
2 
                                                 
1 Notice that this paper does not aim at explaining why companies behave in a socially responsible 
manner, or not. This is an issue of further case studies and empirical investigations that shall be 
based on clear definitions and a sound analytical framework to which the present paper intends to 
contribute. 
2 See also recent elaborations on the related debate about the shareholder versus stakeholder views 
by Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) and Tirole (2006), as well as the contributions in a Special Topic 
Forum on ‘corporations as social change agents’ in the Academy of Management Review (cf. Bies 
et al., 2007).   3 
As an important proponent, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (cf. Holme and Watts, 2000) defined CSR in general terms as “the 
continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of live of the workforce. In an 
analysis of different interpretations of CSR from the business community, Holme 
and Watts emphasize that “CSR is no longer seen to represent an unproductive 
cost or resource burden, but, increasingly, as a means of enhancing reputation and 
credibility among stakeholders”. Accordingly, they understand CSR as 
representing “the human face of the highly competitive world of commerce” and 
of globalization. In other words, it constitutes “the commitment of business to 
contribute to sustainable economic development” (WBCSD, 2002).  
For the European Commission (2001), CSR is a program where “companies 
decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and cleaner environment”. It is 
seen as an option where, along with their prime responsibility of generating 
profits, companies can “contribute to social and environmental objectives, through 
integrating corporate social responsibility as a strategic investment into their core 
business strategy, their management instruments and their operations.” Likewise, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define CSR as “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.” 
In these definitions, voluntariness is regarded as the driving force for CSR. 
Nevertheless, it “should not be seen as a substitute to regulation or legislation 
concerning social rights or environmental standards, including the development of 
new appropriate legislation”, as the European Commission (2001) pointed out. 
Rather, CSR calls for shared responsibility between government and private 
actors, such as to enhance human rights, environmental protection and social 
development. This position is also supported by Hopkins (2004) in an ILO 
working paper. However, he takes a critical position against the European Union’s 
definition of CSR and suggests that the word ‘voluntary’ should be eliminated, if 
one does not want to exclude consideration of any regulation. For him, “CSR is 
concerned with treating the stakeholders of the firm ethically or in a responsible 
manner”, whereas the terms ‘ethically’ and ‘responsible’ mean “treating 
stakeholders in a manner deemed acceptable in civilized societies.” Moreover, 
Hopkins emphasizes that “The wider aim of social responsibility is to create 
higher and higher standards of living, while preserving profitability of the 
corporation, for people both within and outside the corporation.” 
Seeking to study and enhance the public role of private enterprises, the 
Kennedy School of Government’s Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at 
Harvard University also addresses ethical aspects of corporate behavior. It has 
correspondingly defined CSR to “encompass not only what companies do with 
their profits, but also how they make them” (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005). Moreover, 
CSR is seen as a concept which “goes beyond philanthropy and compliance to   4 
address the manner in which companies manage their economic, social, and 
environmental impacts and their stakeholder relationships in all their key spheres 
of influence: the workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain, the community 
and the public policy realm.” This interpretation reveals the role of CSR as a 
guiding concept for business that, on the one hand, needs room for contextual 
interpretation, and, on the other hand, also calls for taking societal values and 
demands into consideration. 
In an implementation guide for Canadian business (Government of Canada, 
2006), CSR is interpreted as “the way firms integrate social, environmental and 
economic concerns into their values, culture, decision making, strategy and 
operations in a transparent and accountable manner and thereby establish better 
practices within the firm, create wealth and improve society.” Moreover, with 
emphasis on businesses’ pivotal role in job and wealth creation in society, CSR is 
promoted as a central management concern. Apparently, this is in line with the 
standard textbook argument in favor of free market economies and perfect 
competition. However, this position abstracts from various sources of 
imperfection that destruct market systems from maximizing social welfare; that is, 
from achieving the highest possible level of well-being in society. 
Stressing the latter issue, Heal (2005) argues that an understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of competitive markets suggests a role for CSR 
programs. His focus is on two important sources of market imperfection: 
externalities and distributive fairness. The former is generally defined in terms of 
deviations between private and social marginal costs and benefits, which 
ultimately results in an inefficient allocation of scarce resources and social 
welfare losses. The latter is an issue of societal value judgments that can be 
expressed through the political process and defines the reference with regard to 
which efficiency can only be determined (Just et al., 2004: 10). 
Heal (2005: 388) points out that “almost all conflicts between corporations 
and society can be traced to one of these two sources – either discrepancies 
between private and social costs and benefits, or different perceptions of what is 
fair.” Consequently, he regards CSR being defined as “a programme of actions to 
reduce externalized costs and to avoid distributional conflicts.” This clearly 
provides a reason to theoretically investigate CSR from a welfare economic 
perspective of corporate behavior. 
This argument is furthermore supported by the observation of Paton and 
Siegel (2005) that “the analysis of CSR is still somewhat in embryonic stage and 
critical issues regarding frameworks, measurement, and empirical methods have 
not been resolved.” Accordingly, further analyses are required that help to 
improve the understanding about the relationships between CSR and closely 
related concepts, such as corporate governance (cf. Beltratti, 2005; Thomson, 
2006; Tirole, 2001; Van den Berghe and Louche, 2005) and corporate   5 
sustainability (cf. Atkinson, 2000; Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; Marrewijk, 2003; 
Salzmann et al., 2005; Schaltegger and Burritt, 2005; Wilson, 2003). In particular, 
further research and clarification on the relationship and distinction between CSR 
and CS is crucial, since the two are often confused and used as synonyms. 
Drawing upon the relevance of measuring corporate sustainability, Atkinson 
(2000), for instance, points out that “corporate entities are increasingly under 
pressure to demonstrate how they contribute to the national sustainability goals 
outlined by government.” He draws attention on the fact that the emerging debate 
on this topic has resulted in various concepts of ‘corporate sustainability’ and 
‘corporate (environmental) responsibility’. With a view on how businesses might 
adapt and improve environmental accounting and reporting practices, Atkinson 
propagates an approach of full cost accounting that includes external costs, and 
that is conceptually based upon microeconomic theory and an extension of the 
polluter pays principle to the domain of accounting. His contribution builds on 
established approaches of welfare measurement and green national accounting 
that are well established in the economics and national accounting literature on 
sustainable development (e.g. Aronsson et al., 1997; Atkinson et al., 1997; 
Neumayer, 1999). However, as most economic approaches of CS and CSR, 
Atkinson’s analysis is restricted to environmental aspects. The same bias is 
recognized by Paton and Siegel (2005) in their editorial to a special journal issue 
on the economics of CSR. In contrast, heuristic multi-criteria approaches of CS, 
such as the triple bottom-line or three-pillar concepts, are based on a broader view 
that encompasses economic, social and ecological dimensions (e.g., Dyllick and 
Hockerts, 2002: Schaltegger and Burritt, 2005). However, most of these 
approaches do not have a sound economic foundation that would allow for 
evaluating trade-offs across different conflicting objectives. This shortcoming is 
crucial when it comes to cost assessments and the evaluation of CSR activities 
and corporate performance. 
3  CSR and corporate sustainability in a Paretean view 
of the firm 
3.1  The basic CSR framework 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted and unified definition, the above review 
of literature reveals that most interpretations of CSR encompass and integrate 
both a business dimension and a social or ethical dimension. The former explicitly 
refers to the companies’ prime responsibility of generating profits (European 
Commission, 2001) and the preservation of profitability (Hopkins, 2004). The 
social dimension is expressed in terms of improving the quality of live, or well-
being, for selected groups or for society as a whole (WBCSD, 2002; Hopkins,   6 
2004; Government of Canada, 2006). In the view of some commentators, this 
explicitly includes environmental objectives (European Commission, 2001), or is 
more generally formulated with regard to the global challenge of sustainable 
development (Atkinson, 2000; Holme and Watts, 2000; OECD, 2001). 
From an analytical point of view, the overall task is to integrate these distinct 
objectives into accounting and decision making at the firm or corporate level. This 
is most adequately expressed in Beltratti’s (2005) conclusion that “socially 
responsible firms do try to maximize profits but at the same time try to improve 
the welfare of other stakeholders.” This involves an extension of the mere profit 
maximization framework of the firm to also include concern for the well-being of 
other stakeholders or the welfare of society at large. Accordingly, we can 
formulate the subsequent working definition of CSR and its formalization, which 
constitutes the reference framework for further considerations on the relationship 
between CSR and CS, the internalization of externalities through the channel of 
reputation capital, and the integration of the societal and corporate perspective.  
DEFINITION 1:  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a program of 
action where a firm’s objective is to maximize its profits and, at the same time, to 
contribute to the improvement of social welfare. 
Based on this definition, we elaborate a formal approach that allows us to 
evaluate a company’s performance form a CSR perspective. For an individual 
company, this can be dealt with in two different ways:  
a)  CSR can be comprehended in terms of a company’s objective of jointly 
maximizing its profits and its contribution to the well-being of other 
stakeholders: 
  )) ( ), ( ( max
} { x x W u
x Δ π  (1) 
with u representing the company’s or the entrepreneurs utility or preference 
function, π(x) the firm’s instantaneous profit as a function of its activity 
vector  x, and ΔW(x) the resulting net contribution to the level of social 
welfare, beyond the generation of the company’s profits. This involves a 
continuous program of evaluating the trade-off between the company’s 
financial contribution to its shareholders and its contribution to social 
welfare at large.
3 
Alternatively, this problem can be formalized as follows: 
  )] ( ) ( ) 1 [( max
} { x x W
x Δ ⋅ θ + π ⋅ θ −  (2) 
                                                 
3 A formal representation of a social welfare function from a sustainable development perspective 
is provided in Section 4.    7 
with  θ denoting the entrepreneurs’ or shareholders’ propensity to 
benevolence, their disposition to do good (0 ≤ θ ≤1). In the case where the 
owners have full preference for benevolence (θ = 1),  the company’s  sole 
objective would be to maximize its contribution to social welfare, which 
could apply for a not-for-profit organization. In the other extreme with 
θ = 0, we get the mere profit maximization framework without concern for 
social welfare. 
b)  CSR can also be formalized in a stronger form as a constrained optimization 
problem where the company maximizes its profits without curtailing the 
well-being of other stakeholders. From a theoretical point of view, this can 
be referred to as Pareto improvement which, in general, is fulfilled if at least 
one person is made better off by pursuing a course of action without making 
any other individual worse off. Formally, this can be expressed in terms of 
maximizing one individual’s utility subject to the constraint that all others 
are at least at a given utility level, as originally presented by Lange (1942). 
With regard to CSR, this standard problem of welfare economics can 
straightforwardly be translated into a problem of maximizing one firm’s 
profit π(x) as a function of its activity vector x, subject to the constraint that 
some suitably defined measure of social welfare W does not fall under the 
reference level W0 = W(z
o) that society could enjoy without the firm’s 
activity: 
  0 } { )) ( ( . . ) ( max W W t s
x ≥ x z x π  (3) 
In this formal representation, social welfare W is a function of z, a vector of 
the attributes that determine individual and social well-being. These 
attributes can be thought off as encompassing such issues as aggregate levels 
of income or consumption (beyond the firm’s profit), social capital and 
environmental quality, as well as degrees of macroeconomic stability.
4 The 
different attributes can be positively or negatively affected by the firm’s 
activities  x, compared to the unaffected levels of the attributes that are 
symbolized by z
o. The latter influences the reference level of social welfare 
W0, which determines the bottom line for the evaluation of the company’s 
CSR performance. 
The optimization problem in equation (3) can also be represented by the 
Lagrangean  
  ] )) ( ( [ ) ( 0 W W L − ⋅ + = x z x λ π  (4) 
                                                 
4 See also Sections 4 and 5.   8 
that formally expresses the firm’s internal evaluation of its instantaneous 
profit and contribution to society. Here λ denotes the so-called implicit price 
or shadow price of the welfare constraint W0. This is the marginal value of 
tightening the constraint by an infinitesimally small unit, expressed in terms 
of the conditionally foregone profit. In other words, λ represents the firm’s 
marginal opportunity cost of its (voluntary or enforced) commitment to 
improving social welfare through its own choice of activity. This is the 
company’s marginal cost of providing an additional net benefit to society. 
If the CSR constraint is not binding, and therefore λ  =  0, then the 
company is “socially responsible” by definition. Its privately optimal level 
of activity, x*, which is defined by the first-order condition π’(x*) = 0, 
results in a social welfare level W(z(x*)) > W0 and the company’s profit-
maximizing behavior creates a net social benefit. In contrast, if the profit-
maximizing level of activity x* would result in social welfare below the 
reference level W0, then the shadow price of the CSR constraint would be 
positive (λ  > 0). It measures the company’s marginal cost of compliance 
with that constraint, and gives information to the company’s decision 
makers (owners and executive managers). 
The second approach provides a formal basis to capture in an operational way 
the meaning of CSR as expressed by Beltratti (2005). It does not imply that a 
company must necessarily satisfy this strong criterion and behave socially 
responsible. Rather, it allows us to describe on a theoretical basis the minimum 
CSR condition of improving social welfare. This provides a formal definition that 
allows us to compare on a clear analytical basis the concept of CSR with that of 
CS (see Section 3.3). Moreover, it presents a formal approach that can be further 
extended to include additional issues in our analysis, such as reputation capital 
and the internalization of externalities (see Section 3.4), and it constitutes the 
reference framework for the evaluation of the corporate contribution to 
sustainable development from a societal perspective (see Section 5). 
3.2  Externalities and fairness in distribution 
In the absence of externalities and other market imperfections, competitive 
markets would solve the above optimization problems by simply maximizing 
instantaneous profits. This can be illustrated with Adam Smith’s classic remark 
that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (quoted from 
Heal, 2005). If however, externalities are present, it is known from economic 
theory that social welfare losses arise without adequate institutional arrangements. 
The related costs can, however, be internalized trough regulation, bargaining 
processes or pressure groups that enforce firms to treat these costs like private   9 
costs in decision making. In this regard, Heal concludes that “CSR can play a 
valuable role in ensuring that the invisible hand acts.” 
Moreover, Heal emphasizes that “markets produce outcomes that are efficient 
but not necessarily fair” and draws attention to the prospective role of CSR in 
anticipating and minimizing distributional conflicts before they flare up. Thus, the 
issue is not for companies to replace the government in distribution and social 
policy. Rather, they are advised to carefully act in their own interest. 
Formally, concerns about fairness in distribution can be included in our 
analysis by replacing the aggregate welfare function W with a weighted sum of 
individual welfare, such as originally introduced by Bergson (1938), or any other 
form of a social welfare function that accounts for differences in individual 
welfare and income distribution. This is not subject to further considerations in 
this article, as it only leads to an extension of our formal expressions without 
providing additional insight at this stage of the analysis. However, the 
consideration of issues of distribution and fairness may be crucial in empirical 
analyses and polit-economic discussions about corporate behavior and CSR 
performance. 
3.3  Comparing CSR and CS 
At this point, we direct our attention to another important aspect of the economics 
of corporate responsibility and sustainability; that is, long-term profit 
maximization and capital accumulation. In this dynamic setting, the x and z 
vectors are time dependent, and the firm’s net revenue π(xt,kt) is a function of the 
firm’s current activities xt and stock of capital kt. It is distributed in form of 
dividends yt to the shareholders and used for investments gt in the firm’s capital 
stock, which is to be purchased at the current market price pt: 
  t t t t t g p y k + = π ) , (x  (5) 
Thus, a firm’s intertemporal allocation problem is to maximize the present value 
V of the stream of net shareholder benefits over the firm’s time horizon T, with the 
control variables xt and yt, the state variable kt and the initial stock of capital k0, as 
well as the discount rate (interest rate) r that, for simplicity, is assumed constant: 
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V(kT) denotes the value of the firm’s productive capacity (capital stock kT) at 
time T, and δ the constant rate of capital depreciation (δ >  0). Accordingly, we   10 
must reformulate definition 1 to include corporate value V instead of short-term 
profits and get: 
DEFINITION 1a:  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a program of 
action where a firm’s objective is to maximize its corporate value and, at the 
same time, to contribute to the improvement of social welfare. 
Thus, together with the welfare constraint  
  ) ( )) ( (
o
t t t W W W z x z = ≥  (7) 
the optimization problem (6) characterizes the Paretean comprehension of the 
CSR problem in an intertemporal setting.
5 For each moment in time, or short time 
period, it can be depicted by the subsequent Lagrangean function 
  () ] )) ( ( [ ] ) , ( [ t t t t t t t t t t t W W k p y k y L − ⋅ λ + δ − − π ⋅ ϕ + = x z x  (8) 
with ϕt and λt denoting the shadow prices of the capital stock and the welfare 
constraint, respectively. Using the differential equation in (6), this can be 
transformed to 
  ] )) ( ( [ ) , , ( t t t t t t t W W y k H L − ⋅ λ + = x z x  (9) 
with the current-value Hamiltonian  
  t t t t t t t k y y k H H & ⋅ ϕ + = = ) , , (x  (10) 
The latter depends on the current stock of capital kt and the set of corporate 
activities  xt at time t. It consists of two components. The first one simply 
represents the income (profit, dividend) distributed to the shareholders. The 
second component stands for the rate of change of the firm’s capital value. This is 
the intertemporal variation of the firm’s productive capacity (net capital 
accumulation) multiplied with the implicit price of capital ϕt.  
Unlike the first term, which relates to the current or short-term profit effect of 
xt, the second can be viewed as the future or long-term profit effect of xt. It 
accounts for the fact that capital accumulation serves the aim of enhancing 
corporate profits in the future. In this sense, the Hamiltonian (10) represents the 
overall profit prospect of the various corporate decision options, conditional to the 
current choice of activity (cf. Chiang, 1992: 207). Thus, from a capital-owner’s 
perspective, it is the value of the Hamiltonian  t t t t k y H & ⋅ ϕ + =  that must be 
maximized, rather than instantaneous profit yt or net revenue πt. In other words, 
the corporate objective to be addressed encompasses the total of the immediate 
                                                 
5 Notice that this will be further extended to include reputation capital at the end of this section.   11 
profits generated during a short time interval (such as one accounting year or a 
quarter) and the increase in the value of the capital stock during that time period. 
Altogether, this is the value of the total contribution of current corporate activities 
to immediate and future profits (Dorfman, 1969).  
In analogy to the standard definition of national income or net national 
product (Hicks, 1946; Weitzman, 1976, 2000), this internal value of corporate 
activity corresponds to the largest permanently maintainable level of income that 
is generated in favor of the owners of the company. Hence, in accord with the 
general definition of sustainability at the aggregate economy level, corporate 
sustainability is most usefully defined with reference to the Hamiltonian Ht: 
DEFINITION 2:  Corporate sustainability (CS) requires that the corporate 
value is maximized and does not decline over time. This implies a non-declining 
total contribution of current corporate activities to immediate and future profits 
over time ( 0 ≥ t H & ) at the highest possible level (max Ht) for all t.  
In this sense, CS is defined with respect to a company’s productive capacity 
and its development along the intertemporally optimal trajectory of long-term 
profit maximization, given the company’s initial capital endowment (productive 
capacity). 
It follows that pure maximization of immediate profits (max πt) is not in 
general sufficient for corporate sustainability, and that instantaneous profits could 
only be used as a proxy of corporate performance and sustainability in the 
restricted case with a constant stock of capital ( 0 = t k & ). In the presence of 
heterogeneous capital, the latter can be compatible with a decline in some assets 
as long as it is compensated by adequate investment in substitute capital to 
maintain the company’s productive capacity. In analogy to the fundamental 
principle from resource economics (cf. Hartwick, 1977, 1978; Solow, 1986; 
Hediger, 2006), this can be referred to as a ‘generalized Hartwick rule’ at the 
corporate level. 
In addition, our analysis of the intertemporal optimization problem suggests 
that CS and CSR are not synonym, but interacting concepts. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1 which shows that both concepts share the same intertemporal objective 
function, namely maximization of the Hamiltonian Ht. But they are defined 
through different constraints that must be satisfied.   12 
For all t:  CS:   
CSR:  ) , , ( max
} , { t t t y y k H
t t
x
x   s.t.    t t W W ≥ )) ( ( x z  
  s.t.    0 ≥ t H &    
Figure 1: Formal distinction between CSR and CS 
On the one hand, CSR requires that the Lagrangean in equation (9) is 
maximized at each time. This implies maximization of the Hamiltonian (10) 
subject to the given welfare constraint (bottom line). But, unconstrained 
maximization of the Hamiltonian (10) is not sufficient for CSR as long as market 
imperfections exist and the ‘invisible hand’ cannot do the job. In contrast, long-
term profit maximization is sufficient for CSR if the company generates an excess 
of net external benefits to society by solely following profit-oriented motives. In 
this case, the welfare constraint would be non-binding and the company by 
definition behaves socially responsible at zero cost.
6 
On the other hand, maximization of the Hamiltonian Ht does not necessarily 
result in a non-decreasing value of the overall profit prospect ( 0 ≥ t H & ), which is 
required for corporate sustainability. Rather, as a consequence of the current stage 
of corporate development (capital stock and capital productivity), instantaneous 
profits and profit prospects may first increase and then decline in course of the 
business cycle. Thus, corporate sustainability will require adequate investment of 
current profit shares into diversification of activities to substitute for old ones in 
order to compensate for anticipated income losses at the later phase of market 
development. 
3.4 CSR  and  reputation 
So far, our analysis indicates the internalization of externalities and the 
satisfaction of multiple bottom line criteria must primarily be seen as conditions 
of CSR, rather than criteria of corporate sustainability. Yet, this gradually changes 
if externalities and reputation influence the overall profit prospect and corporate 
value. In this case, the relationship between CSR and corporate sustainability 
becomes tighter, and therefore needs further consideration. 
In this regard, Heal (2005) points out that the role of CSR is “to anticipate and 
minimize conflicts between corporations and society and its representatives”. 
Consequently, CSR can help “to improve corporate profits and guard against 
                                                 
6 Compare the discussion of the shadow price λ in Section 3.1.   13 
reputational risks.” This coincides with Beltratti’s (2005) emphasis that CSR is 
positively related to the market value of firms.
7  
To include this important issue in our formal analysis, we consider a firm’s 
reputation Rt as additional state variable (reputation capital) that increases if the 
company provides external benefits to society and declines in case of negative 
externalities caused by the company’s activities, respectively.
8 Formally, this is 
given by the differential equation 
  t t
t
t E R
dt
dR
R ⋅ = = ) ( ψ &  (11) 
with ψ(Rt) > 0 (ψ′ > 0, ψ″ < 0) representing the state-dependent proportionate rate 
of impact of the firm’s externalities upon its reputation, and Et denoting the net 
externality caused by the firm’s current activities. The latter is defined as the 
excess of the resulting welfare W(z(xt)) above the reference level Wt: 
  t t t t W W E E − ≡ = )) ( ( ) ( x z x  (12) 
It is positive if W(z(xt)) exceeds the bottom-line Wt, and it is negative if W(z(xt)) is 
below this reference level. 
The latter case (Et  <  0) is crucial with respect to the threat of reputational 
risks, since current externalities not only affect the firm’s instantaneous reputation 
but also its future values. From this point of view, negative externalities (Et < 0) 
constitute a source of reputational risks that, according to Heal (2005), can be 
managed through CSR programs. 
Assuming that the current state of reputation affects the firm’s immediate 
revenues, this cumulative impact of current and past externalities can be formally 
captured as follows: 
  ) , , ( t t t t R k x π = π      with    0 > ∂ π ∂ R    and    0
2 2 < ∂ π ∂ R  (13) 
Consequently, the current level of corporate value must also include the 
reputation capital. Hence, it changes from equation (10) to  
  ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( t t t t t t t t t t t E R k y R y k H H x x ⋅ ψ ⋅ μ + ⋅ ϕ + = = &  (14) 
                                                 
7 This position is partly contradicted in the literature, such that conclusions about the relationships 
between CSR and financial performance are mixed (cf. Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). However, a 
comparison of empirical studies that investigate the relationship between CSR and the market 
value of firms suffers from the lack of a common definition and measure of CSR. 
8 Notice that this is a simplified formalization which must be improved and differentiated 
according to more specific research questions in future investigations. This simplification is used 
here to introduce the issue of externalities and reputation and to reconsider our previous findings 
with regard to CSR and CS.   14 
with μt denoting the implicit value (shadow price) of reputation capital at time t 
and  t t t t t t k y R k k δ − − π = ) , , (x & . 
According to our definition 2, CS only necessitate maximization of the 
Hamiltonian Ht without consideration of the welfare constraint, but at the same 
calls for a non-declining corporate value; i.e.  0 ≥ t H & . Thus, when a company 
faces reputational risks, CS requires that the extended Hamiltonian (14) is 
maximized at all times and that this corporate value is non-declining over time. 
The resulting level of a company’s activities is privately optimal and improves 
social welfare in as much as the company cares for external costs and benefits of 
its activities as a means to mitigating reputational harms. However, this is not in 
general sufficient for CSR. 
As formalized in equation (14) and visualized in Figure 2, the inclusion of 
reputation capital enlarges the formal definition of corporate value and broadens 
the scope of the CS concern, such that it partly overlaps with the domain of the 
CSR constraint. However, as in the case of pollution, the internalization of 
negative externalities (with the reputation capital) does not result in a complete 
elimination of those. Rather, it brings about an interior solution and an optimal 
level of negative externalities that is between the original situation (without 
consideration of reputation issues) and complete elimination of external costs.  
For all t:  CS:   
) , , , ( max
} , {
t t t t
y R y k H
t t
x
x    
CSR: 
  s.t.    t t W W ≥ )) ( ( x z  
  s.t.    0 ≥ t H &    
Figure 2: CSR and CS with internalization of externalities  
through reputation capital 
In contrast, as comprehended in definition 1a, CSR requires continuous 
maximization of the company’s Hamiltonian (14) subject to the constraint of non-
declining social welfare due the company’s activities. Formally, this is expressed 
by the problem of maximizing the Lagrangean 
  ] )) ( ( [ ) , , , ( t t t t t t t t W W R y k H L − ⋅ λ + = x z x  (15)   15 
This means that CSR calls for maximization of the Lagrangean Lt for all t. In 
other words, CSR implies maximization of the Hamiltonian (14) and requires 
compliance with the welfare constraint [W(z(xt)) – Wt] ≥  0. As a consequence, 
negative externalities resulting from the firm’s activities would be eliminated with 
the satisfaction of the CSR constraint.  
However, it is not in general efficient that a company fully eliminates its 
negative externalities and achieves compliance with the welfare constraint. 
Rather, the inclusion of reputation in the calculus of long-term profit 
maximization and pursuit of the CS objective results in an optimal outcome from 
the company’s perspective, which is a compromise between the two extremes of 
CSR and CS in the original illustration in Figure 1. However, this is not generally 
sufficient for a socially optimal internalization of externalities. Thus, a 
combination of private initiative and public policy might be required. 
From this perspective, CSR thinking can be regarded as a useful approach for 
a company to cope with negative externalities and their potentially adverse effect 
on corporate value and profit prospects. It can particularly serve the better 
perception of external threats, and can therefore be seen as insurance against 
reputational risks. But CSR does not ascertain the maintenance or even growth of 
corporate value, just as CS does not generally involve compliance with the CSR 
constraint. In other words, CSR is not in general sufficient for CS, and vice versa. 
Moreover, one must recognize that our formulation of CSR as a Pareto 
improvement program does not explicitly refer to the broader objective of 
sustainable development. The latter involves a societal concept of equality and 
posterity and goes beyond traditional conceptions of welfare economics and 
ethics. 
4  Sustainable development and social welfare 
Having so far elaborated formal definitions of CSR and CS in a Paretean 
perspective of the firm, we further need a welfare economic framework for the 
evaluation of a company’s CSR performance from a sustainable development 
perspective. To this end, we can build on existing approaches from the ecological 
economics literature. 
As originally advocated by the WCED (1987), sustainable development 
requires that “the goals of economic and social development must be defined in 
terms of sustainability”. This has resulted in numerous definitions and 
interpretations of sustainable development and sustainability. From an academic   16 
point of view, the most important debate has been about the seemingly opposing 
concepts of weak and strong sustainability.
9 
On the one hand, weak sustainability is defined as an economic value 
principle which is founded within the body of neoclassical capital theory and 
natural resource economics. It requires that some suitably defined value of 
aggregate capital – including human-made capital and the initial endowment of 
natural resources and social assets – must be maintained intact over time. In 
narrow terms (very weak sustainability), it requires that the generalized 
production capacity of an economy is maintained intact, such as to enable 
constant consumption per capita through time (Solow, 1986). In broader terms, 
weak sustainability requires that the welfare potential of the overall capital base 
remains intact. This is consistent with in a non-declining level of social welfare. 
On the other hand, the idea of strong sustainability emerged from the pre-
analytic vision of ecological economics that the economy is an open subsystem of 
the finite and non-growing global ecosystem (Costanza et al., 1991). This bio-
physical principle is founded upon the laws of thermodynamics, and requires that 
certain properties of the environment must be sustained. In the least restrictive 
version,  strong sustainability is an ecosystem principle that can either be 
translated in a principle of maintaining the ecological capital intact over time, or 
restricting environmental degradation above some critical level. 
In a study about explicit and implicit assumptions in different models of 
sustainability, Hediger (2006) shows that the concepts of very weak sustainability 
and strong sustainability coincide as a special case of the welfare-based concept of 
weak sustainability. The latter allows for the evaluation of trade-offs across 
different concerns. It does not rule out economic growth by assumption. Rather, 
the analysis reveals that environmental conservation and economic growth can be 
compatible with each other, without jeopardizing social welfare. Therefore, we 
propagate the use of a welfare-based weak sustainability framework for the 
further analysis, as most adequate for a continuous evaluation of trade-offs across 
different system goals and societal concerns (see also Barbier, 1987).  
Following Hediger (2000), the weak sustainability framework is most usefully 
formalized in terms of a social welfare function U that increases with aggregate 
income Y, macroeconomic stability M, social capital S, and ecological capital Q:
10 
                                                 
9 See Hediger (1999, 2000), Neumayer (1999) and Perman et al. (2003) for an overview and 
further references. 
10 UY and UYY etc. denote the first and second derivatives of U with respect to Y, M, S and Q. The 
first derivatives correspond to the marginal value (marginal social utility) of aggregate income and 
the current state of the macroeconomic, social and ecological system, respectively.   17 
  ) , , , ( Q S M Y U U =  (16) 
with    0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > > > Q S M Y U U U U  
and    0 , 0 , 0 , 0 < < < < QQ SS MM YY U U U U  
The ecological capital consists of the stocks of renewable resources, semi-
natural and natural land areas, as well as ecological factors (such as nutrient 
cycles, climatic conditions, etc.). It represents that part of the natural capital base 
which determines the overall quality of the ecosystem, and is perceived and 
valued by individuals for its multiple benefits and values. In contrast, the broader 
concept of natural capital refers to the natural resource base of a geographic area. 
It corresponds to the ecological capital plus the stocks of non-renewable resources 
that are not included in the former, but constitute an important factor of the 
economy’s productive capacity. 
Social capital embraces essential factors of economic production and social 
life. It is in itself an input for social capital accumulation, and is a valuable asset 
as such: human health, literacy and life expectancy, cultural and social integrity, 
and social cohesion are generally considered as determinants of human well-being 
(cf. Atkinson et al., 1997; UNDP, 1990). Accordingly, these components of social 
capital are considered in the above social welfare function, in addition to the 
ecosystem quality (ecological capital), aggregate income, and determinants of 
macroeconomic stability (full employment, inflation, etc.).  
Altogether, this enables a formal analysis and definition of sustainability 
terms, going beyond the original conception of weak and strong sustainability, as 
summarized above. Rather, it extends the ecological-economic framework of 
weak sustainability to the social and macroeconomic context of human 
development. This allows us to go beyond the traditional conservation-versus-
development debate and to address trade-offs across the various economic, social 
and ecological system goals. Formally, this can be determined by setting the total 
differential of our welfare function (16) equal to zero: 
  0 = + + + = dQ U dS U dM U dY U dU Q S M Y  (17) 
This is illustrated by the U0(Y,Q,S0,M0)-curve in Figure 3. Given the initial 
situation with Y0, Q0, S0 and M0, this indifference curve represents the minimum 
condition of weak sustainability, which is non-declining social welfare over time:  
  0 ≥ + + + = Q U S U M U Y U U Q S M Y & & & & &
 (18) 
Apparently, this transcends the strong sustainability concepts of ‘ecological 
sustainability’ (non-declining ecological capital:  0 ≥ Q & ), ‘social sustainability’ 
(non-declining ecological capital:  0 ≥ S & ) and ‘economic sustainability’   18 
(0 ≥ + M U Y U M Y & & ). The latter matches the traditional domain of macroeconomic 
stabilization policy that is to balance across the different goals of adequate income 
growth, full employment and price-level stability.  
The obvious strength of the weak sustainability concept is the implicit 
evaluation of trade-offs across different domains of concern. This permits the 
ecological capital to decline, for instance, if compensated in form of higher 
income, social capital or macroeconomic performance. In turn, the concept has 
been criticized because of this explicit substitutability assumption. However, as 
shown in a recent examination of explicit and implicit assumptions in models of 
weak and strong sustainability (Hediger, 2006), this critique does not justify the 
use of a strong sustainability criterion of constant natural or ecological capital, 
such a propagated by Daly (1991) and others. Rather, levels of criticality must be 
included in the analysis that are imposed by thresholds of ecosystem resilience 
(Common and Perrings, 1992; Pearce et al., 1994) or basic human needs and the 
‘poverty line’ (WCED, 1987; Atkinson et al., 1997). Following Hediger (1999), 
this is considered in Figure 3 and in equation (19) with the critical levels of 
income and ecological capital, Y# and Q#, as well as those of macroeconomic 
stability and social capital, M# and S#. 
 
Figure 3: The weak-sustainability frontier and the sustainability-based  
social value function [Source: Hediger (2000)]   19 
As illustrated in the economy-environment sphere of Figure 3, the 
consideration of these critical levels confines the social opportunity space for 
sustainable development. Any modification of the system across these boundaries 
could impose irreversible change (Hediger, 2000), and thus significantly reverse 
the variety of possible actions for a long time into the future (Henry, 1974) and be 
infinitely costly to reverse (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). This involves a fundamental 
challenge for sustainable development and problem of the weak sustainability 
concept, since irreversibility would not be anticipated along the indifference curve 
U0. But irreversible change would suddenly appear when the system reaches 
either limit Q# or Y#. This may not in general be socially and economically 
desirable. Therefore, a sustainability-based social value function has been 
proposed (Hediger, 1999, 2000) that matches values based on aggregate 
individual preferences, the current state of development of economy, society and 
the environment (Y0, M0, S0, Q0), and critical limits (Y#, M#, S#, and Q#), and that 
anticipates potentially irreversible changes at the boundaries of the opportunity 
space for sustainable development: 
  ( )
# # # #
0 0 0 0
   , ,    ,   for
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=
 (19) 
Apart from the current state of development {Y0, M0, S0, Q0}, this function is 
different from the indifference curve U0 which is exclusively based on individual 
preferences. Its isoquants asymptotically approach the minimum standards Y#, M#, 
S#, and Q#. Correspondingly, the W0-curve does not intersect the preference-based 
social value function U0 in Figure 3. Thus, the indifference curve of the 
sustainability-based social welfare function implies equivalent combinations of Y, 
M, S and Q that are above those of the U0 locus. 
An important feature of this modified welfare function is the implicit balance 
across different approaches. In particular, the trade-offs among the different 
system goals are higher valued with the sustainability-based social value function 
than in the conventional weak sustainability framework, which is exclusively 
preference based. Thus, for society to be indifferent in the course of development, 
the rate of income growth that would be required to compensate for the 
degradation of social and ecological capital is higher in an integrated 
sustainability framework than traditional welfare concepts would suggest. With 
regard to the evaluation of changes, this means that an ‘implicit risk premium’ 
must be added to the preference-based valuations of net marginal benefits of these 
changes. In Figure 3, this premium corresponds to the difference in slope between 
the  W0 and U0 curve for the additional income required to compensate for 
environmental degradation, for instance.   20 
5  Integrating the societal and corporate perspective 
The next step is to integrate the corporate perspective with the evaluation of 
changes at the societal level, taking into account the above sustainable 
development perspective. To this end, we elaborate a formal approach for the 
evaluation of a company’s total contribution to society along the above described 
sustainability-based social value function, which is defined for a given state of 
development {Y0, M0, S0, Q0} and depicted by the W0-curve in Figure 3. Formally, 
this modified indifference curve is determined by the following equation 
  ()
0
, , , , , , 0 0 0 0
= + + + = dQ W dS W dM W dY W
Q S M Y Q S M Y dW
Q S M Y
 (20) 
It can be reformulated as follows: 
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with dM, dS and dQ denoting changes in macroeconomic performance, social 
capital and ecological capital, and βM = WM/WY, βS = WS/WY, and βQ = WQ/WY the 
sustainability-based societal values of changes in M, S and Q, respectively.  
If dY corresponds to the company’s contribution to the income generated in 
the economy in a given year, then the right-hand side of equation (21) gives the 
minimum value of the company’s contribution to society in the domains of 
macroeconomic performance (e.g., full employment), social capital and 
environmental quality. Thus, if we represent company j’s impact on the socio-
economic and environmental system in time period t by dMjt, dSjt and dQjt, then 
the income it generates in that period must be 
  ] [ jt Q jt S jt M jt dQ dS dM dY β β β + + − ≥  (22) 
in order to be judged as a positive net contribution to sustainable development. 
Assuming that this total income is distributed as profit (dividend) yjt to the 
shareholders and as labor income ωjt to employees of the company, or retained for 
productive and reputational capital accumulation  jt jtk & ϕ  and  jt jtR & μ , respectively, 
we can reformulate equation (22), with Hjt denoting the total profit prospect 
(corporate income) at time t: 
  ] [ jt Q jt S jt M jt jt jt jt jt jt jt dQ dS dM R k y H β + β + β + ω − ≥ μ + ϕ + = & &  (23) 
The right-hand side in this formula is the external evaluation of the company’s 
contribution to society (social welfare, social well-being), as defined from a 
sustainable development perspective. By reformulation, we get the overall value   21 
of the company’s contribution to society that consists of the internal value of the 
overall profit from a shareholder perspective and the external value of its direct 
and indirect contributions to society: 
  0 ] [ ≥ + + + + = Γ jt Q jt S jt M jt jt jt dQ dS dM H β β β ω  (24) 
This replaces equation (9) and (15), respectively, if an external evaluation of a 
company’s CSR performance is requested. In this case, βM,  βS and βQ are 
externally determined accounting prices that must, in principle, be based on an 
assessment of individual preferences and the above mentioned risk premiums for 
the anticipation of potentially irreversible changes at the boundaries of the social 
opportunity space for sustainable development. It is confined by the critical limits 
of social, ecological and economic capital, as mentioned in Section 4. 
With reference to this modified evaluation criterion, we can conclude that a 
company’s CSR performance – i.e., its contribution to sustainable development – 
is positive if Γjt – H jt > 0. However, this is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
corporate sustainability Rather, CS requires, as a minimum condition, that the 
corporate value and profit prospect must be non-declining over time. Formally, 
this implies that dHjt/dt must be non-negative.  
Thus, the evaluation of a company’s contribution form a sustainable 
development perspective does not fundamentally change the evaluation of its CS, 
since the latter is determined by the economic value of the corporate capital stock, 
rather than some arbitrarily prescribed sustainability criteria. In other words, 
corporate sustainability is a capital-based concept that refers to a company’s 
productive capacity, whereas CSR is a welfare-related concept that integrates the 
internal and external evaluation of a company’s performance. Nonetheless, both 
CSR and CS can contribute to sustainable development, by either improving 
social welfare function or directly serving the aim of sustainably managing capital 
stocks in our economies. 
6 Summary  and  conclusion 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), there is common ground in the different interpretations that 
it can be comprehended as a program where firms act such as to maximize profits 
and at the same time to improve the welfare of other stakeholders. From a welfare 
economic point of view, this corresponds to the principle of Pareto improvement, 
which can be formalized as a constrained optimization problem and brings the 
CSR debate to a solid foundation within economic theory. It helps to identify on 
an analytical basis different issues that are involved with the CSR problem and 
that are important to improve our understanding of CSR and sustainability.    22 
The first issue concerns the opportunity cost of a firm’s voluntary or enforced 
commitment to improving social welfare. This cost can be assessed as part of an 
internal CSR evaluation program, such as formalized in the above mentioned 
optimization problem. Secondly, the extension of our analysis to the intertemporal 
context of long-term profit maximization reveals that CSR and corporate 
sustainability (CS) are distinct, but interacting concepts. The former is grounded 
within welfare theory. In contrast, CS is based on a capital-theoretic approach 
that, in analogy to the concept of very weak sustainability (or economic 
development), can be formalized as an internal optimization problem of 
maintaining a firm’s profit prospect or corporate value unaffected over time. 
Thirdly, our theoretical analysis supports Heal’s (2005) and Beltratti’s (2005) 
emphases on the relevance of externalized costs and reputational risks as well as 
on the positive relationship of CSR upon the market value of the firm. It shows 
that CSR can support CS, and vice versa, if externalities and reputational risks 
that potentially harm the firm’s future profits are internalized in corporate 
decisions.  
Finally, our analysis elucidates the relationships between CSR, CS and 
sustainable development. The latter is a societal concept that can be usefully 
formalized by the means of a sustainability-based social welfare function, which 
implies a balance between different approaches of weak and strong sustainability. 
It particularly integrates preference-based values and the anticipation of 
potentially irreversible changes that could occur at critical levels of ecosystem 
resilience, social cohesion, macroeconomic stability or basic human needs. 
Referenced to the current state of development in an economy, the corresponding 
indifference curve can be used to evaluate a company’s contributions to society, 
using external accounting prices. Building on this background, our analysis 
reveals how CS and CSR are different from the concept of sustainable 
development, but that both can contribute to achieving the objective of the latter.  
Corporate sustainability refers to an internal objective of maintaining the 
capital stock and corporate value, rather than fulfilling some arbitrarily 
determined sustainability criteria. It indirectly serves the objective of sustainable 
development by its objective of sustainable asset management. In contrast, CSR 
refers to the way companies manage their internal resources (including 
shareholders’ expectations) and at the same time contribute to the welfare of other 
stakeholders (society). These fundamental differences as well as the relationships 
between the concepts of CSR, CS and sustainable development must adequately 
be taken into account in theoretically sound investigations of corporate 
contributions to society. To effectively include all stakeholders’ interests, the 
analysis must be further extended to include considerations of shareholder-
management relationships (corporate governance) into a comprehensive CR 
framework.   23 
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